Research interests
Knowledge, uncertainty and institutional decision-making
My developing research interests concern how people and institutions form judgments and act when knowledge is incomplete, expertise is distributed, and the systems being governed are technically complex.
Current direction
I am interested in questions at the intersection of epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of technology, ethics, and decision theory. A recurring concern is the movement from evidence to judgment to action: what should count as adequate evidence, when reliance on experts is justified, how uncertainty should affect belief and decision, and how institutions organise these processes.
This is a developing research direction rather than a fixed dissertation programme. Artificial intelligence is one important contemporary case because it concentrates problems of technical complexity, asymmetric knowledge, evaluation, uncertainty, and institutional response, but the broader questions extend beyond any single technology.
Knowledge and uncertainty
My epistemological interests concern evidence, expertise, disagreement, rationality, and the conditions under which people or institutions are justified in relying on knowledge they cannot independently reproduce. I am also interested in forecasting as a disciplined way of making beliefs about possible futures more explicit, testable, and useful for decision-making.
Technology and institutions
I am interested in how complex technologies change the distribution of knowledge, expertise, agency, and authority. This includes questions about how public and private institutions acquire technical knowledge, how they remain capable of independent judgment when expertise is unevenly distributed, and how technological systems reshape existing concepts and practices.
Measurement, standards and decision
A related interest is the transition from concepts to measurements, evaluations, standards, and decisions. What does a test actually establish? When does a metric represent the thing it is intended to measure? How do uncertain findings become thresholds, standards, or institutional rules? These questions connect philosophy of science and measurement with decision-making under uncertainty.
Ethics, agency and strategy
My earlier work in ethics remains important where epistemic questions become questions about action: how much evidence is enough to justify intervention, who should bear technological risk, what responsibilities accompany superior knowledge, and how agency and responsibility are distributed across complex systems and organisations.
Strategy interests me at this transition from understanding to action. Institutions and other actors have to make consequential choices with limited information, competing objectives, and uncertain futures. I am interested in both the philosophical foundations of those judgments and the practical disciplines used to improve them.
Methods and wider background
Alongside philosophical analysis, I am developing competence in formal logic, probability and decision theory, empirical methods, statistics, and programming. My wider philosophical background includes ethics and value theory, aesthetics, social and political philosophy, philosophy of mind, German idealism, ancient philosophy, and philosophy of science.
My academic background and selected results are available in my academic CV.